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INSTRUCTIONS IN REGARD TO THE SPEED OF MOTOR
TRUCKS, A STUDY IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Frank Murray*
The framing of proper instructions in automobile accident
cases, especially in regard to speed, has been a difficult problem
for the lawyers of Kentucky. Even the Court of Appeals has
frankly admitted its own error in the formulation of what were
to be model instructions for the guidance of lawyers and lower
vourts. The preparation of proper instructions in regard to the
speed of trucks has been extremely difficult due to the fact that
since 1932 Kentucky has had two statutes, side by side in the
books, one prohibiting unreasonable and improper speed and
stating certain rates of speed that shall, under given conditions,
be prima facie evidence of improper driving, and the other
absolutely prohibiting driving in excess of certain stated speeds.
That difficulty still exists in an intensified form since both of
these provisions were re-enacted in 1942 and now appear as subdivisions of K RS 189.390.
In order to understand the decisions which have approved
or disapproved various types of instructions from time to time,
and in order to determine the proper form of future instructions,
it is necessary to review briefly the development of the statutory
law in regard to the speed of motor vehicles.
Subsection (1) of KRS 189.390 regulates speed by establishing a general standard, that the speed shall be reasonable and
prudent under the circumstances. This is followed by paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) which describe certain areas or places
of operation and provide that speed greater than the rates
therein specified shall be prima facie evidence of violation of
the prescribed standard. This form of regulation, which is
Professor of Law, University of Kentucky, Lexington, Ky.
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found in many other states, was adopted in 1910, replacing the
arbitrary miles-per-hour limit formerly used. It has appeared,
with some changes in figures and words, as Section 2739g-51 of
all editions of Carroll's Kentucky Statutes from 1910 through
1936. As such it has always applied to passenger automobiles,
and, except for a six-year period from 1932 to 1938, it has applied to trucks. In fact the section,' as reenacted in 1920, applied expressly to trucks by the addition of three subdivisions
classifying trucks according to rated capacity and providing
that speeds in excess of stated rates should be prima facie evidence of unreasonable and improper driving.
In 1932, in an act relating exclusively to trucks and regulating their size, weight and equipment, there was a flat regulation
of speed on an arbitrary mile-per-hour basis according to the
gross weight of the truck and load and place of operation. This
provision was codified as Section 2739g-86 of all subsequent editions of Carroll's Kentucky Statutes. In Hopper v. Barren
Fork Coal Co.,' it was stated that this Act repealed by implication the special provisions of Section 2739g-51 relating to the
speed of trucks. This was based on the conclusion that these
two sections were necessarily conflicting and incompatible. The
statement in the Hopper case was applied in Nehi Bottling Co. v.
Flavnery,2 in holding an instruction given under Section
2739g-51 improper when applied to trucks. In subsequent cases,
such as National Linen Supply Co. v. Snowden, 3 and Meriweather's Adrn'x. v. Pickering,4 the Court expressed or indicated doubt as to the rule stated in the Hopper and Flannery
cases. But from 1932 until 1938, it was reversible error to instruct to the effect that the speed of a truck in excess of the rate
provided in Section 2739g-51 constituted only prima facie evidence of negligence. It was proper to instruct that it was the
duty of the driver to drive at a reasonable and proper speed and,
if the evidence warranted, that a speed in excess of the flat
mile-per-hour rate prescribed in Section 2739g-86 was absolute
negligence.
This was followed in 1938 by the enactment of a somewhat
comprehensive motor vehicle law which added many new provi'263
1264
:288
273

Ky. 446, 92 S. W. (2d) 776 (1936).
Ky. 68, 94 S. W. (2d) 297 (1936).
Ky. 374, 156 S. W. (2d) 186 (1941).
Ky. 367, 116 S. W. (2d) 670 (1938).
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sions and amended and re-enacted many sections of the 1936
Statutes. No express mention was made of Section 2739g-86 but
Section 2739g-51 was reenacted. The first three subsections,
which had originally referred to "passenger automobiles" but
which by an apparent typographical error in the Act of 1926
then referred to "passing automobiles," were retained with some
change in the rate of speed that was to be considered prima facie
evidence of unreasonable and improper driving. Subsections
(4), (5) and (6) of Section 2739g-51, which had provided a
similar rule of evidence in regard to the speed of trucks, were
omitted in the re-enactment. In National Linen Supply Co. v.
XSi'wu'dnc,5 it was held that since the 1938 Act was later in time
and since "passing automobiles" applied to all types of motor
vehicles, it repealed by implication Section 2739g-86, which related only to trucks. There seemed to be some idea that the
statutes might apply to different situations and conditions and
that Section 2739g-86 might have some effect outside the scope
of Section 2739g-51. But this idea was apparently abandoned
in Thomas v. Dahl,5 which held that the re-enactment of Section
2739g-51 in 1938 had the effect of repealing Section 2739g-86
and that instructions in regard to the speed of trucks should be
the same as those given in reference to the speed of passenger
automobiles, and in terms of prima facie rather than absolute
negligence. This was approved in Miles v. Soztheastern Motor
7
Truck Lines.
The DaM and Miles cases, which definitely held that Section
2739g-86 of the 1936 statutes was repealed by the Act of 1938,
were not decided until after the enactment of the Revised Statutes in 1942. The Reviser of the statutes, as was his duty under
the circumstances, copied both provisions into the Revised
Statutes as separate parts of the same section. Section 2739g-51
of Carroll's Statutes, as reenacted in 1938, became Subsection
(1) of KRS 189.390, and Section 2739g-86, of the old statutes,
,riginally enacted in 1932, is now Subsection (3) of the same
section. For convenience, the subsection numbers will be used
in referring to these provisions. We now have two provisions of
the Revised Statutes which, according to their language, purport
'288 Ky. 374, 156 S. W. (2d) 186 (1941).
"293 Ky.808, 170 S.W. (2d) 337 (1943).
'295 Ky. 156, 173 S. W. (2d) 990 (1943).
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to regulate the speed of trucks and which prescribe different
rates of speed under identical driving conditions and provide
different penalties for violation. One designates a rate of speed
of "motor vehicles" that shall be prima facie evidence of unreasonable and improper driving and the other prescribes an arbitrary mile-per-hour limit for trucks, the violation of which is
negligence per se. This is the same problem that was presented
in 1932 and again in 1938 except then the apparent conflict
could be solved by applying the rule that the last enactment expresses the will of the legislature. These provisions are parts of
the 1942 Revision, enacted as a single act, and as such they speak
as of the same date, KRS 446.130. The Revised Statutes of
1942 speak for themselves and the fact that Subsection 3 was
impliedly repealed will not necessarily affect its validity. ', However, it is proper to consider Subsection (1) in the light of the
decision in National Linen Supply Co. v. Sniowden, 9 since on the
re-enactment of a statute which had previously been constructed
by the Court, it will be presumed the legislature intended to incorporate such interpretation into the re-enacted statute. "
Where there is an apparent conflict between two parts of
a statute, the courts should, if it is possible, reconcile and harmonize them so that both may stand. The first method of
reconciliation that comes to mind is the application of the rule
that a particular statute, one concerned with specific subject
matter, is to be construed as an exception to a general statute.
As applied here, the regulation of the speed of trucks would be
excepted from the operation of Subsection (1) and would be
governed exclusively by Subsection (3). This is what the Court
expressly refused to do in the Dal case in regard to these same
provisions, and it would be more difficult now since the ambiguous "passing automobiles" as used in the 1938 Act, under
which the Dal case was decided, has been changed to the more
inclusive term "motor vehicles" as defined in KRS 189.010
(12). Other objections, then raised, still apply, as, for example,
this interpretation would allow a truck weighing 5,000 pounds or
'KRS 446.130; Mannini v. McFarland, 294 Ky. 837, 172 S. W.
(2d) 631 (1943).
'288 Ky. 374, 156 S. W. (2d) 186 (1941).
"Falender v. Hankins, 296 Ky. 396, 177 S. W. (2d) 382 (1944);
Caywood v. Coleman, 294 Ky. 858, 172 S. W. (2d) 548 (1943); Ray
v. Spiers, 281 Ky. 549, 136 S. W. (2d) 750 (1940).
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les,; to operate through a residential area at a greater speed than
would be prima facie proper for a passenger automobile. Subsection (4) excepts from the provisions of Subsection (1) certain vehicles of the truck type. It can hardly be said that the
legislature did not intend Subsection (1) to apply to trucks and
then expressly excepted certain vehicles of this type from its
provisions. Or, as was pointed out in the Dal case, the specific mention of certain vehicles as being excepted from the operation of Subsection (1) indicates "that the legislature did not
intend to except cars of any other kind." It seems clear that
,';ubsection (1) must be interpreted as applying to trucks.
We might consider the possibility of construing Subsection
(1) as applying to both trucks and passenger automobiles with
Subsection (3) as an addition thereto providing an absolute
maximum speed limit for trucks only. This sounds practicable,
but when applied to the statute we find that, since the limits prescribed in Subsection (3) are never greater, and generally lower,
than the corresponding figures in Subsection (1), this interpretation would have the effect of entirely excluding trucks from
the operation of Subsection (1). This, as we have seen, cannot be
done without violating all the canons of statutory construction.
If such an interpretation were possible, it would force us into
untenable positions as, for example, a speed of 31 miles an hour
by a heavy truck in open country would be an absolute violation
and negligence per se, but a speed of 46 miles an hour by the
same truck under the same conditions would be only prima facie
evidence of negligence as provided in Subsection (1). In a
residential area, 25 miles an hour would be a prima facie violation, but 20 miles an hour would be an absolute violation. Attention should be called to the fact that these subsections provide different penalties and that the heavier penalty may be
invoked in case of a violation of the subsection which provides
for the lower speeds.
If these two subsections could be "separated from their
antecedents and origins" and looked at apart from their histories, it might be possible to say that Subsection (3) is the
punitive statute applicable to trucks and Subsection (1) is the
punitive statute applicable to other motor vehicles but also provides the rule of evidence of negligent driving to be used in civil
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actions involving all types of motor vehicles. If this somewhat
fanciful interpretation were adopted in order to save a part of
the statute, instructions in civil actions in regard to the speed
of trucks would be given under the prima facie evidence rule
provided in Subsection (1).
The only practical solution is to follow the course established by the Court of Appeals on two separate occasions and
clearly marked by many decisions. After the enactment of Subsection (3) in 1932, and again after the re-enactment of Subsection (1) in 1938, the Court found that these two provisions
were conflicting and irreconcilable, and that one must fa!l in
order that the other might stand. In the enactment of the Revised Statutes, it was anticipated that situations of this kind
would arise and a method of solving the difficulty was provided.
KRS' 446.130 provides in part:
....... in cases of conflict between two or more sections or
of a latent or patent ambiguity in a section, reference may be
had to the Acts of the General Assembly from which the sections are indicated to have been derived, for the purpose of
applying the rules of construction relating to repeal by implication or for the purpose of resolving the ambiguity."

In referring to the Acts of the General Assembly for the
purpose of applying the rules of construction relating to repeal
by implication, it is impossible to escape the conclusion that the
enactment of Subsection (1) in 1938 repealed the prior and conflicting speed' laws now appearing as Subsection (3).
As has been held in all cases involving truck accidents since
1938, it is believed that the instruction in regard to the speed of
trucks should be the same as that given in respect to passenger
automobiles. This solution, however, will not end all the difficulties with these instructions. There is a common conception,
as indicated by the signs along the highways, that the mile-perhour figures in KRS 189.390 (1) are arbitrary speed limits.
Trial courts, as shown by the many remanded case3, have not
entirely avoided this error. The real problem is in framing an
instruction that will inform the jury that a stated mile-per-hour
speed creates a presumption of negligence but is not the conclusive and final test. The instruction must not follow the words of
the statute since any mention of prima facie evidence violates
"the fundamental rule that the jury should not be told specifi-
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eally upon whom the burden rests or that a presumption of law
is against one of the parties.' "I
The Court of Appeals, in Nowak v. Joseph,12 suggested that
the instruction in regard to speed, when proper, should be incorporated into a general instruction defining all the pertinent
duties of the driver and prepared a model instruction suitable
to the facts of that case. The paragraph in reference to speed
reads as follows:
"To drive his car at a speed no greater than 15 miles per
hour, unless you believe from the evidence that the speed of
defendant's car, though greater than 15 miles per hour, was not
unreasonable and improper driving, considering the traffic and
use of the street at that time and place, in which event this duty
was not incumbent upon him."
This instruction, although it would probably be considered
sufficient, seems to put the emphasis on the evidence of violation of the statute rather than on the violation itself. The violation which establishes the negligence is the unreasonable and
improper speed under the circumstances. The speed in terms of
miles per hour is only prima facie evidence creating a rebuttable
presumption which should be subordinate to the real prohibition
of the statute. There may be a violation of the statute, although
the speed is much less than the rates prescribed in Subsection
(1). 1 3 Conversely, one may drive at a greater speed and be
4
guilty of neither negligence nor violation of the statute.'
There was some change in the statute as re-enacted in 1942.
The word "proper" has been changed to "prudent" and the
jury is now admonished to consider the condition of the highway
as well as its use. These changes should be incorporated in
future instructions. In the instruction setting out the duties of
the driver of a truck, it is suggested that the instruction in
Now k v. Joseph be slightly re-arranged so as to read:
"To drive his truck at a speed no greater than was reasonable and prudent having regard for the traffic and for the condition and use of the highway and not to exceed a speed of
miles per hour unless you believe from the evidence that the
speed, though greater than
miles per hour, was not unreasonable and improper driving."
" Gorman v. Berry, 289 Ky. 88, 158 S. W. (2d) 5 (1941); Utilities Appliance Co. v. Toon's Adm'r., 241 Ky. 823, 45 S. W. (2d) 478.
' 275 Ky. 470, 121 S.W. (2d) 939 (1938).
"Tate v. Shaver, 287 Ky. 29, 152 S. W. (2d) 259 (1941); Forgy
v. Rutledge, 167 Ky. 182, 18o S. W. 90 (1915).
"Kappa v. Brewer, 207 Ky. 61, 286 S. W. 831 (1924); Moore v.
Hart, 171 Ky. 725, 188 S. W. 861 (1916).
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The general instruction on the duties of the driver, of which
the paragraph on speed is only a part, will, of course, include
the statement that the failure to observe any of the duties warrants recovery if, and only if, the failure was the proximate
cause of the injury. The form of the statement suggested in
Nowak v. Joseph should be followed. However, in cases where
the pleadings and evidence are sufficient to warrant an instruction on behalf of the defendant, as in case of contributory negligence, last clear chance, or unavoidable accident, the form of
the instruction suggested in Nowak v. Joseph should be changed
so as to include a reference to this defense. 15 However, instructions, without express reference to other instructions on defenses, have been approved where it is reasonably clear to the
jury that they are alternatives.' 6
A failure to instruct in the manner suggested is not necessarily reversible error. It is not the duty of the court on its
own motion to give all the law of the case in a civil action, or to
instruct on every issue pleaded and proved. "A1l that is required is that the instructions shall be correct as far as they go.
If additional instructions are desired, they should be requested.''17 A party objecting to an instruction need not supply the omission nor correct the error. If the court, on its own
motion, instructs on certain issues, an erroneous prejudicial instruction is reversible error. Where the pleadings and evidence
warrant an instruction in regard to speed, and an instruction is
offered, "it is error not to properly instruct on the point although the offered instruction cannot be given because not correct in form."Is
The statute was not intended to create a presumption of
negligence as to accidents having no relation to traffic and an
instruction which follows the statute should not be given in
respect to automobile accidents and injuries not related to traffic
and highway conditions and which "would have occurred re' National Linen Supply Co. v. Snowden, 288 Ky. 374, 156 S. W
(2d) 186 (1941).
'0 Wight v. Rose, 209 Ky. 803, 273 S. W. 472 (1925).
'Murphy v. Harmon, 291 Ky. 504, 165 S. W. (2d) 11 (1942);
Kappa v. Brewer, 207 Ky. 61, 268 S. W. 831 (1924).
' Murphy v. Harmon, 291 Ky. 504, 165 S. W. (2d) 11 (1942);
Wight v. Rose, 209 Ky. 803, 273 S. W. 472 (1925).
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gardless of the condition and use of the highway and in the
absence of any traffic whatever."' 9
No instruction in regard to speed should be given unless
speed is made an issue by the pleadings. A general charge of
negligence is sufficient unless it is connected with allegations
of specific acts of negligence, in which case the pleader is restricted to the specified acts in his proof and submission to the
jury. *- ' Although the pleadings are sufficient, no instruction
should be given in regard to speed unless there is evidence of
excessive and improper speed sufficient to authorize submission
to the jury.2 ' This requirement is not satisfied by evidence that
the truck was moving or that it was being driven at any certain
rate of speed less than that prescribed in KRS 189.390 (1), unless there is sufficient evidence that this speed was unreasonable
and improper under the circumstances. 22 In some of the recent
opinions there are statements that proof of speed less than the
rates prescribed in KRS 189.390 (1) creates a presumption that
the speed was reasonable and proper. Such a presumption is not
warranted by the statute and is not proper.
Excessive speed, in itself, is not a tort. It is necessary to
establish causation, and unless there is sufficient evidence that
the excessive speed was the proximate cause of the injury, no
instruction should be given in regard to the speed. 23 Under this
rule, evidence that the excessive speed merely increased the injury is not sufficient. In Mutrpkty v. Hozas,24 in discussing a
peremptory instruction, it is stated that the test is whether the
speed played any part in the accident and whether "the acci,
dent would have resulted regardless of the rate of speed." This
test tends to be misleading in a case involving the collision of two
moving objects since by a slight variation in the speed of either
the collision might have been avoided. In determining the issue
of proximate cause, only the speed in excess of a reasonable and
'Newton v. Weatherby's Adm'x., 287 Ky. 400, 153 S. W. (2d)

947 (1941), and see Hopper v. Barren Fork Coal Co., 263 Ky. 446,
92 S.W. (2d) 776 (1936).
""Lang v. Cooper, 262 Ky. 407, 90 S. W. (2d) 382 (1936).
STANLEY, INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES, Sees. 18, 19.
SSandard Oil Co. v. Thompson, 189 Ky. 830, 226 S. W. 368

(1920).
-Lieberman v. McLaughlin, 233 Ky. 763, 26 S. W. (2d) 753
(1930); Knecht v. Buckshorn, 233 Ky. 329, 25 S.W. (2d) 727 (1930).
2'286 Ky. 191, 150 S.W. (2d) 14 (1941).
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proper rate should be considered. If the relative positions of
the plaintiff's and the defendant's automobiles were the same
and if the accident would have occurred although the defendant
were driving at a reasonable rate of speed, the excessive rate is
not the cause of the injury and no instruction should be given in
regard to speed.2 5 Proof of speed in excess of the rate prescribed
in KRS 189.390(1) creates a presumption of unreasonable and
improper driving and hence of negligence, but it has been said
that evidence of such speed also creates a presumption that the
speed was the proximate cause of the injury "so as to make it
incumbent upon one who is operating his car in excess of such
speed to show the same did not produce the injury.'"-1' This
presumption does not seem to be proper and is probably the result of confusing care and causation.
Where a plaintiff who was negligent relies on the last clear
chance doctrine, evidence on, and hence an instruction in regard
to, the defendant's speed before he discovered or should have
discovered the plaintiff's peril is improper. 2T This follows the
approved doctrine "that one guilty of contributory negligence
cannot base his right of action upon the antecedent negligence
of the one causing the injury. ''28 This rule does not apply where
there is conflicting evidence of the plaintiff's negligence. 2
Generally speed is not an issue when the injury is directly due
to mechanical failure or other cause classed as an "unavoidable
accident." In an action by a guest to recover for injuries due
to the locking of a wheel on the truck in which he was riding, the
court should instruct the jury to find for the defendant if they
believe the accident was the result of some defect in the truck
unknown to the defendant. Helton v. Prater'sAdnz,'r.30 is a
'Knecht

v. Buckshorn, 233 Ky. 329, 25 S. W. (2d) 729 (1930);

Lieberman v. McLaughlin, 233 Ky. 763, 26 S. W. (2d) 753, and see
Denunzio v. Donahue, 204 Ky. 705, 265 S. W. 299 (1924) and Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Mitchell's Adm'x., 276 Ky. 671, 124 S. W. (2d)
1025 (1939).
2"Wight v. Rose, 209 Ky. 803, 273 S. W. 472 (1925); Moore v.
Hart, 171 Ky. 725, 188 S.W. 861 (1916).
'Braden's Adm'x. v. Liston, 258 Ky. 44, 79 S. W. (2d) 241
(1935).
'Louisville and Nashville R. R. Co. v. Mitchell's Adm'x., 276
Ky. 671, 124 S. W. (2d) 1025 (1939).
'Short Way Lines v. Sutton's Adm'r., 291 Ky. 451, 164 S. "W.
(2d) 809 (1942).
'272 Ky. 574, 114 S.W. (2d) 1120 (1938); Schilling v. Heringer,
252 Ky. 624, 67 S.W. (2d) 979 (1934).
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similar case. In both of these cases there was evidence of unreasonable speed at the time of the mechanical failure. But in
another and more recent guest case, where the upset was due to
a blow out, a judgment in favor of the defendant was reversed
because "it excused the defendant from liability regardless of
the rate of speed he might have been driving" since "itis almost
common knowledge that a blowout at a reasonable rate of speed
'
will not cause a car to overturn. "31
When the defense is based
on all emergency, it is proper to instruct in regard to unreasonable speed since this defense is not available to one who was
negligent prior to and at the time of the emergency.3 2
There are situations where it may be proper to give a general
instruction in regard to speed by stating the duty to drive at a
speed no greater than is reasonable and prudent and to omit any
reference to a mile-per-hour rate. In order to warrant an instruction to the effect that any certain mile-per-hour speed is
prima facie evidence of negligence, there must be evidence identifying the place of operation as one described in paragraphs
(a), (b) or (c) of KRS 189.390(1).33
Even if there is sufficient evidence of the place of operation to justify an instruction
under the proper paragraph of KRS 189.390(1), no instruction
should be given unless there is more than a scintilla of evidence
that the truck was travelling in excess of the speed prescribed.
In a ease involving the application of paragraph (c) it was said
that evidence of speed "from 45 to 50 miles per hour" is sufficient to warrant an instruction in regard to speed in excess of
45 miles per hour. 34 But in a later case, Miles v. Souttheasternz

Motor Tritck Lizes, 5 the Court was not satisfied with this ruling
and reexamined the record and found that the witness testified
"between 45 and 50 miles an hour, something like that" and
" Murphy v. Harmon, 291 Ky. 504, 165 S.W. (2d) 11 (1942).
"Miles v. Southeastern Motor Truck Lines, 295 Ky. 156, 173
S. W. (2d) 990 (1943); Golubic v. Rasnick, 239 Ky. 355, 39 S.W.
(2d) 513 (1931); Evans, The Standard of Care in Emergencies (1942)
31 Ky. L. J. 207.
-Patton v. Gannett, 296 Ky. 533, 177 S. W. (2d) 888 (1944);
National Linen Supply Co. v. Snowden, 288 Ky. 374, 156 S.W. (2d)

186 (1941); Southern Oxygen Co. v. Martin, 291 Ky. 238, 163 S.W.
(2d) 459 (1943); Cundiff v. Nave, 240 Ky. 47, 39 S. W. (2d) 471
(1931); Sharp v. Rawls, 234 Ky. 438, 28 S. W. (2d) 493 (1930).

" Southern Oxygen Co. v. Martin, 291 Ky. 238, 163 S.W. (2d)
459 (1941).-,
:'295 Ky. 156, 173 S.W. (2d) 990 (1943).
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expressed doubt that this was sufficient to warrant the instruction. The Miles case held that evidence that the truck was going
"45 or 50 miles" was not sufficient to show the ,speed to be
greater than 45 miles per hour, other testimony indicating a
lower rate of speed, and that it was improper to incorporate in
the instruction any reference to a mile per hour rate of speed.
Evidence of speed in excess of the rates prescribed in KRS
189.390(1) creates only a presumption of negligence, but in the
absence of rebutting evidence, the court should give a peremptory instruction to find for the plaintiff, or, if other matters are
in issue, instruct that the driver was negligent.3"
In addition to the regulations now found in KRS 189.390,
the statutes have, from time to time, limited speeds under certain
driving conditions such as approaching or traversing intersections, bridges, sharp curves or steep descents. There were also
prescribed speed limits on meeting or passing a person or beast
on the highway or meeting another automobile. These were
arbitrary mile-per-hour limits, sometimes as low as 3 miles per
hour, and a violation was negligence per se. These special regulations have disappeared from'the statutes or have been replaced
by the general requirement of care and control.3 7 However there
is still an arbitrary speed limit of 10 miles per hour in passing a
school bus stopped on the highway 38 and a limit of 15 miles per
hour on meeting or passing another vehicle on a highway the
surface of which is less than 14 feet wide. Violations of either
of these regulations will be negligence per se.
Speed while traversing sharp curves or steep grades is now
regulated by KRS 189.390 (1) (b) with speed in excess of 25
miles per hour prima facie evidence of unreasonable and improper driving. A sharp curve means a curve of not less than
thirty degrees. 39 A steep grade is a grade exceeding seven per
cent. 40 The jury must not be allowed to guess as to whether a
'Pickering v. Simpkins, 271 Ky. 288, 111 S. W. (2d) 650 (1937).
See also Hornek Bros. v. Strubel, 212 Ky. 631, 279 S. W. 1087 (1920)
and Knecht
v. Buckshorn, 233 Ky. 329, 25 S. W. (2d) 727 (1920).
3
7KRS
189.310 (meeting cars or animals); 189.350 (meeting or
passing cars); 189.410 (approaching curves or obstructions); 189.420
(mountain driving).
"ITKRS 189.370.

-KRS 189.010 (7).
'°KRS 189.010 (9).

SPEED OP MOTOR TRucKs

grade or curve falls within the statutory definition nor to rely
' 41
on "indefinite proof of witnesses who may also be guessing."
A description of a curve as a "sharp curve" is too general and
obviously the mere opinion of a witness and in the absence of
conclusive or uncontradicted proof that it was not less 'than
thirty degrees, the instruction should be given under paragraph
42
(c) and not under the more restrictive paragraph (b).
In conclusion, it should be pointed out that there are parts
of the present statute which are not entirely clear and which
may give rise to some question in the future. The areas described in paragraphs (b) and (c) of KRS 189.390 (1) overlap.
This is due to the omission from the Act of 1926 and subsequent
acts of the phrase "or residence portion" from paragraph (c).
It is clear that this paragraph was intended to regulate speed
in areas not specifically covered in the preceding paragraphs
and it has been so applied. The Court has referred to this paragraph as the one regulating speed in "the open country," but
this is not exact as it provides only a rule of evidence, but one
which is applicable to all areas outside of closely built-up business or residential sections of incorporated cities. This is the
only part of the statute which can be applied to speeds through
congested business or residential areas of unincorporated villages or towns. Formerly the word "town" appeared in what
is now paragraphs (a) and (b) but this was omitted in the 1942
Revision. Paragraph (c) is also ambiguous in its reference to a
"straightaway, unobstructed highway."
"Straightaway"
as
used here does not necessarily mean straight but is used here to
differentiate the paragraph from paragraph (b) which applies
to speed on sharp curves. The adjective "unobstructed" may
give more trouble since it is defined in KRS 189.010 (11) in
such a way that it would impair the practical operation of this
paragraph by making the 45 mile limit inapplicable to main
highways under normal traffic conditions. "Unobstructed highway," as defined in the statute, is a "straight, level, first-class
road upon which no other vehicle is passing or attempting to
pass, and upon which no other vehicle or pedestrian is approaching in the opposite direction closer than three hundred yards."
"' National Linen Supply Co. v. Snowden, 288 Ky. 374, 156 S. W
(2d) 186 (1941)
"2Patton v. Gannett, 296 Ky. 533, 177 S. W. (2d) 888 (1944).
L. J.-2
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This definition was enacted at a time when there were special
regulations of speed on passing or meeting of vehicles or persons
and it was a necessary part of those regulations. The term
"'unobstructed" was at that time made a part of what is now
paragraph (c) in order to prevent a conflict with those special
provisions. But since the special regulations are no longer a
part of our statutes, the term, and its statutory definition, are
unnecessary. A literal interpretation would result in there
being a gap in the statute with no prima facie rule of evidence
applicable to much of the driving outside incorporated cities.

